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FIGURE 1:

SOUTH FLORIDA, THE AREA IMPACTED BY HURRICANE
ANDREW AND SURROUNDING REGION, AND THE STUDY
AREA FOR THIS REPORT
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1. Artificial reefs heavily ~amaged and moved.
2. Offshore coral reefs may be destroyed or damaged; heavy loss of lobster traps.
3. Seagrass communities had minor direct damage but may be affected by erosion and
increased nutrients from runoff.
4. Mangroves flattened, uprooted, or defoliated.
5. Exotic tree species damaged but expected to spread widely and rapidly.
6. Hardwood hammocks heavily damaged or destroyed.
7. Sawgrass visibly unaffected.
8. Moderate to minor pineland and cypress tree damage.
9. Mangrove damage from north of Cape Sable to south of Ten Thousand Islands.
Adapted from T. Grantham, Miami Herald 09-08-92
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When we heard that Hurricane Andrew had slammed
into the south Florida coastline early in the morning of
August 24, 1992, bringing steady winds between 135 and
155 MPH, gusts as high as 170 MPH, spawning even more
destructive tornado winds, killing several dozen people,
and leaving in its wake approximately 20 billion dollars
in property damage, we assumed there must have been
correspondingly devastating impacts on south Florida's
commercial fisheries and fishing peoples (Aide 1993: 1,
and Sun-Sentinel 1992).

And, later that same day, when

television news began to broadcast pictures of Andrew's
horrible destruction, we figured that commercial fishing
peoples in the region must have suffered severe impacts
indeed.

Certainly, a storm as violent and intense as

Hurricane Andrew must have exacted a tragic toll from
south Florida's commercial fishing peoples.
Over the next few weeks we drafted proposals and
applied for Quick Response Grants from the Natural
Hazards Research and Information Applications Center,
which is located on the campus of the University of
Colorado, Boulder, Colorado.

As maritime

anthropologists, we are interested in fishing peoples
and fishing communities, and we were especially
interested in what had happened to south Florida's
commercial fishing peoples as a result of Hurricane
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Andrew.

Eventually, we learned that our proposals had

been favorably reviewed and we made plans to leave for
south Florida.
We feel that commercial fishing peoples merit
special attention when extreme events impact the coastal
zones in which they work and live, and mainly for the
following reasons:

first, commercial fishers are almost

always present in such regions;

second, they are a

distinct and easily recognizable sociocultural and
occupational component of the larger coastal population;
and third, their high degree of dependency on coastal
resources and facilities leaves them particularly
vulnerable to extreme events occurring in the coastal
zones in which they work and live.
For studying the problems of commercial fishers, we
have found the concept of the "natural-resource
community" to be very useful (see Dyer, Gill, and Picou
(1992).

In the fisheries, we define "natural-resource

communities" as peoples whose economic welfare and
sociocultural identities are similarly articulated with,
and dependent upon, certain marine resources.

In this

sense, a "fishing community" may include peoples living
in a named, nucleated settlement, which obviously has a
great deal of fishing industry, as well as dispersed
commercial fishers living here and there along a
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coastline who do not live in a particular settlement.
What is important is that fishers in either situation
have much in common, and for purposes of assessing their
problems and needs it is useful to conceptualize them as
natural-resource communities--as defined above.
Because of the linearity of coastlines, marine
fishers are often dispersed, at least to some degree.
Moreover, when they are few in number, highly dispersed,
and there is no visible settlement that might be
described as a "fishing community" in conventional
terms, such peoples may be neglected or overlooked when
extreme events impact the coastlines where they work and
live.

Thus, by defining the commercial-fishing

"community" as peoples who are highly articulated with
certain marine resources, there is less chance that such
people will be overlooked--such as when assessing the
impact of an extreme event in a coastal zone.
We also feel that conventional definitions of "the
fisheries" must be expanded, such that these are
primarily thought of as human sociocultural and economic
phenomena, rather than merely as a marine realm or a
stock of marine life in a particular marine realm.
Thus, terms such as "the Biscayne Bay fishery" or "the
spiny-lobster fishery," should automatically imply the
presence of human fishers working there, since without
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human activity in a marine realm there is no fishery
there per se.
There is also another, more general reason why we
feel commercial fishing peoples deserve special
attention when extreme events occur in coastal regions.
And this is simply that in spite of their empirical
reality, their sociocultural attributes, and their
economic importance, they are otherwise often overlooked
and neglected when extreme events impact coastal areas.
Indeed, now that the first phase of our study of the
impacts of Hurricane Andrew on south Florida's
commercial fishing peoples is complete, we are even more
firm in this conviction.
As maritime anthropologists, we made a good team in
our study in south Florida.

Dr. McGoodwin has

specialized in marine fisheries since the early 1970's,
has conducted research concerning fisheries policies
under the auspices of the Woods Hole Oceanographic
Institution and the Food and Agriculture Organization of
the United Nations, and has extensive field experience
working among fishing peoples in a variety of cultural
settings.
Fisheries:

His recent book, Crisis in the World's
People, Problems, and Policies (McGoodwin

1990) has received critical acclaim for urging that new,
more inclusive, and more humanistic approaches be tried
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out in fisheries management.

Dr. Dyer also brings

important field experience, training, and insights to
the study of commercial fishing peoples.

Currently he

serves on the Gulf of Mexico Fisheries Management
Council (GOMFMC), a component of the National Marine
Fisheries Services' fisheries-management system which
has responsibility for recommending management policies
for south Florida's fisheries (among others).

This

position has provided Dr. Dyer with a large number of
contacts with other professionals in the naturalresources management "establishment" in south Florida.
He also holds a degree in Fisheries Biology, as well as
an advanced degree in Marine Ecology--some rare
credentials among maritime anthropologists.

Prior to our departure
Prior to leaving we made several telephone calls in
order to set up appointments for interviews with state
and federal officials working in south Florida, as well
as to learn what we could about the situation there in
advance of our arrival.

We contacted agency

representatives of the Florida Department of Natural
Resources (DNR) , the Southeast Fisheries Center of the
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), the local FEMA
response team assigned to natural resources, various
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participants in the commercial fishing industry, and
other local residents of Miami and Dade county.

We also

read everything we could in order to familiarize
ourselves with the region and Hurricane Andrew's impact.
Our plan was to spend nearly a week in south
Florida and to interview as many governmental and
scientific authorities as we could, as well as people in
the commercial fishing industry.

We also planned to

visit as many sites as possible so that we could get a
general idea of the hurricane's impact on the region's
commercial fishing peoples, as well as an understanding
of their most immediate needs in the storm's aftermath.
Just prior to our departure we read a curious item
in National Fisherman, the main journal of record for
the commercial fishing industry in the English-speaking
countries (Fee 1992: 12).

The article, which cited a

biologist from the Florida DNR, portrayed Hurricane
Andrew's impact on south Florida's commercial fishers as
minimal.

"This was not the storm" that scientists had

predicted for years would hit south Florida, the DNR
biologist was quoted as saying.

Elsewhere, regarding

Andrew's impact on south Florida's commercial fishing
industry, the article stated that "most of south
Florida's commercial fishing industry was untouched by
it," and " ••• commercial fishermen were wide-eyed over
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their good luck."

Local marine biologists were also

cited as expressing regrets that the storm had not had
more impact on the sea floor in the region, which, they
said, had long been denied the beneficial, cleansing
effects that a major storm might provide.
Thus, as we prepared to leave we wondered whether
we would find any significant impacts on south Florida's
commercial fishing peoples to study.

Could it be that a

storm of the reported magnitude of Hurricane Andrew had
struck this populous coastline, and yet the region's
commercial fishers had come through practically
unscathed, as the article had said?

In the field
We arrived in south Florida on October 31, 1992,
and promptly got underway.

The first thing we did was

to make a quick inspection of as many places as we could
see along the most severely impacted part of the coast,
and overall we found the devastation to be far worse
than we had anticipated.

All the photographs and

televised news we had seen prior to leaving for
our trip had fallen far short of conveying the actual
extent and severity of the storm on south Florida and
its local inhabitants.
We made this initial reconnaissance in a rented
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automobile during our first two days in Florida,
spending most of this time interviewing various
commercial fishers, learning about how the hurricane had
impacted their work and lives, what their immediate
needs were, and so forth.

We had little trouble gaining

entry into practically all of the areas we wanted to
see;

indeed, we were able to pass freely into some

areas which were still off-limits to the general public,
and which were being patrolled by state police or
federal troops.

For the most part, all we had to do was

explain what we were doing, show some identification and
other documentation indicating what our interests were,
and we were allowed to go practically anywhere we
wanted.
After this initial phase of our field work we met
with officials in various agencies we had contacted
prior to our arrival, mixing these appointments in with
visits to commercial fishers and fish processors located
in, and immediately around, the Miami metropolitan area.
Then, near the end of our stay, we travelled to Key
Largo, which is south of the hurricane's main impact
area, and which various agency officials assured us had
not been significantly impacted by the hurricane.

In

Key Largo we looked over commercial fishing fleets and
talked with local fishers and fish processors.
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Overall, we conducted interviews with all the
governmental authorities we had originally planned to
contact, as well as with key respondents in the local
fishing industry, including fishers, processors, dock
operators, and others involved in the commercial-fishing
sector.

These interviews were supplemented with

telephone interviews of agency representatives of the
NMFS, the local FEMA response team assigned to natural
resources, the Florida DNR, and local residents of Miami
and Dade Counties who had experienced the disaster
event.

Many of our interviews were conducted as

unscheduled, informal dockside intercepts.
Everyone we interviewed was queried in an open
manner, and we always began by explaining that we wanted
to elicit their perceptions of the impacts of the storm
on local, commercial fisheries, as well as what they
thought the commercial fishers' most immediate needs for
relief were now.

Everyone we talked with was given the

opportunity to decline to be interviewed, or to supply
any other information that he/she might prefer to supply
instead.
The foregoing information was supplemented by other
information which we gleaned from NMFS's Fishing Trend
Reports, news articles, newsletters, and other published
material we requested be sent to us after our departure.
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We also received lists of commercial fishers for Dade
County from the Florida DNR, as well as lists of
processors from the NMFS in Miami.

Moreover, we have

continued to make queries concerning what is being done
for south Florida's commercial fishing peoples in the
aftermath of Andrew, both in writing and by telephone,
right up to the time of this report.
In what follows we first summarize the view of the
hurricane's impact on commercial fishers that emerged
from out of our meetings with various agency officials
and scientists in the area.

Overall, they corroborated

what we had read in the National Fisherman shortly
before we arrived in Florida, that is, that the
hurricane's impact on commercial fishers in south
Florida had been minimal.

After this, we will summarize

the view that emerged from our meetings with commercial
fishers and fish processors in south Florida.

Overall,

they provided an opposite view, stressing that the
hurricane had wrought severe impacts on them--a view to
which we now bear witness.

"Minimal impact," the agencies said
For the most part, the various agencies and
research institutions we queried during our study were
the ones we assumed would have been highly involved in
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assessing the impact of the hurricane on the region's
commercial fishing peoples, as well as in coordinating,
and implementing relief for those peoples.

All of

these agencies and research institutions have offices in
the Miami area, and all are within an hour's drive, or
less, from the center of destruction along the coast.
The Florida DNR.

Prior to leaving for our trip we

had contacted the Florida DNR in order to learn about
the impact of Hurricane Andrew on south Florida's
commercial fishing peoples.

Instead, that agency

provided us with information concerning what might have
happened to certain valuable marine stocks, but
otherwise had no information concerning the storm's
impact on south Florida's commercial fishing peoples.
Once we arrived in south Florida and looked into this
matter further, we found that this agency still had not
produced any reports or any other data concerning the
impact of Hurricane Andrew on south Florida's commercial
fishing peoples.

And, as far as we know, it still has

not undertaken any such studies--now nearly 7 months
since the storm hit south Florida.
However, we also learned that the Florida DNR is
mainly responsible for assessing the status of
commercially-valuable marine stocks, as well as other
marine-biological conditions, and is not charged with
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fisheries management per see

We were given the

impression that this agency is mainly responsible for
reporting its assessments of stock conditions to the
National Marine Fisheries Service, and otherwise leaves
most fisheries-management responsibilities, and
agency-fisher working relationships, to that federal
agency.
The NMFS.

We also visited the Southeast Fisheries

Center of the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS)
in Miami, and met with its director and various members
of his key staff.

Overall, they stressed that the

hurricane's impact on fishing peoples in south Florida
had been minimal to non-existent, mainly, they said,
because there were "almost no commercial fishermen" in
the south Florida region.

For the most part, they said,

south Florida is mainly a recreational fishery, and the
few commercial fishers that exist in this region are few
in number and very dispersed.

Recreational fishers,

they told us, had indeed suffered considerable losses,
both in terms of lost or badly damaged boats as well as
severely damaged boat facilities.

However, most of the

boat owners had insurance, they told us, and in any
event the storm's impact on them could not be seen as
particularly grievous since they do not depend on
fishing for the livelihoods.

-14-

Overall, the personnel we talked with at NMFS in
Miami stressed that south Florida's handful of
commercial fishers had come through practically
unscathed.

Curiously, we also learned that nobody who

worked in these offices had made any visits to south
Florida in order to see what impacts commercial fishers
might have suffered.

When asked why, they repeated that

there simply were not many commercial fishers in the
region.

And, so far as we know, this agency has still

not made any efforts to assess the impact of Hurricane
Andrew on south Florida's commercial fishers, nor to
learn what is needed in terms of relief and
reconstruction.
Near the end of our visit to the NMFS offices in
Miami, the officials we met with mentioned an important
group of commercial fishers whose boats and processing
facilities were berthed along the Miami River, right in
downtown Miami.

These fished for spiny lobsters, they

said, a highly-valuable species, and because their boats
all had ridden out the storm safely secured in their
berths along the Miami River, they assured us that these
fishers had " come through just fine."

When we asked if

anybody from NMFS had interviewed any of these fishers,
one staff member joked with us, saying, "no , how could
we, none of us speak Cuban."
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The RSMAS.

We also visited the Rosentiel School of

Marine and Atmospheric Science (RSMAS), which is just
across the street from the offices of the Southeast
Fisheries Center of the NMFS.

RSMAS, Florida's most

prestigious marine-science institution, is a part of the
University of Miami, and is supported to a great degree
by the Sea Grant Research Program of the National
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).
NOAA, of course, also administers the NMFS.
While at RSMAS we learned that this institution
already had a large-scale proposal in development which
entailed an ambitious assessment of the impact of
Hurricane Andrew along the south Florida coast.
However, this proposal included no plans to study the
storm's impact on commercial fishing peoples.

The draft

proposal we obtained from RSMAS after our visit to
Florida indicated that interdisciplinary scientific
teams, staffed almost entirely by researchers from
RSMAS, were going to investigate the storm's impact on
the region's marine biology, geology, water chemistry,
and other phenomena reflecting traditional oceanographic
concerns.

And now, despite our urging that RSMAS

broaden its study to include assessments of the storm's
impact on commercial fishing peoples, we have had no
response, nor any other indications from that
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institution, suggesting that it has any plans to do so.
Momentarily, we were encouraged when, after our
return from Florida, we received from RSMAS a
comprehensive description of the research it planned to
undertake, which included a section describing an intent
to study the "Boating Community" in south Florida.
However, it seems this will mainly entail studying how
sunken boats--nearly all from the recreational
sector--are now contributing to the pollution of the
region's harbors and bays as they slowly leak fuels and
lubricants into the water.
The FEMA and the SBA.

Two other agencies might

have focused some special attention on commercial
fishing peoples in south Florida, yet as far as we know
have not.

These are the Federal Emergency Management

Agency (FEMA), and the Small Business Administration
(SBA).

Perhaps this is understandable, at least in view

of the magnitude of destruction Andrew caused compared
with the limited resources these agencies had to work
with.

The FEMA, for example, was overwhelmed with the

local populace's needs for such fundamentals as food,
clothing, and shelter, and did not have sufficient
personnel or other resources that might allow it to
address the special needs of a particular occupational
sector--such as commercial fishers.

Similarly, with
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more than 82,000 businesses badly damaged or utterly
destroyed in the region, the SBA did not have adequate
resources for addressing the problems of any particular
business sector, although we did learn of a few loans it
made to various commercial fishers (Aide 1993:

1).

Hurricane Andrew's Impact on Florida's Fisheries
Information we have gathered before, during, and
after our field study, as well as that which can be
inferred from data provided by various governmental
agencies, professionals working in Florida's fisheries,
and scientific and media sources, all lead to the
inescapable conclusion that Hurricane Andrew's impact on
Florida's commercial fishers was far more extensive and
severe than has been officially acknowledged.
Practically everywhere we looked we discovered grievous
impacts, and practically every fisherman and processor
we talked to had a tragic story to tell.

In what

follows, we summarize the impacts to Florida's fisheries
that we were able to discover in a comparatively short
amount of time, and with a comparatively small amount of
effort.
General impacts on south Florida's fishing peoples
and fishing industry.

In general, all fishers, fish

processors, and fish marketeers throughout south Florida
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(including those located throughout the Florida Keys)
experienced severe economic hardships in the months
following the storm as a result of drastic declines in
demand for the marine products they customarily
produced, processed, or traded.

Thus, even fishers who

otherwise suffered no direct damages from the storm to
their vessels, gear, shore facilities, or targeted
marine species in the south Florida region, including
those located throughout the Florida Keys, were still
very adversely impacted by the storm.
This is a less visible but no-less-real adverse
impact of the storm on local fishing peoples, which is
not as dramatic, perhaps, as boats smashed and sunk at
their berths, but no less deadly from a socioeconomic
perspective.

With more 160,000 people forced to find

other places to live immediately following the storm,
and 82,000 businesses damaged or destroyed, which
brought about widespread unemployment in the impacted
region, a large segment of south Florida's populace was
left at least temporarily unable to purchase seafoods
(Aide 1993:

1).

This problem still persists for many

members of the fishing industry who live in south
Florida, with many fishers who survived the storm more
or less intact now finding themselves unable to stay in
business.

Of course, this in turn has adverse effects
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on still more people who work in businesses which serve
the fishing industry--those working in boat repair
yards, businesses selling fishing gear and other
equipment, and so forth.
Impacts on the spiny lobster industry.

Spiny

lobsters are an important, especially valuable natural
resource in southeast Florida, with the nearshore areas
of Biscayne Bay and Biscayne National Park (see Figure
1) being major harvest areas for fishers from Dade and
Monroe Counties.

We interviewed approximately a dozen

lobster fishers, as well as key personnel working in a
major lobster processing plant along the Miami River
docks, asking them about the impacts of Andrew on their
fishery.
Overall, we learned, there are approximately 60
fishermen who work as primary producers out of 22 boats
along the Miami River.

All but two or three of these

are from Cuban backgrounds, the remainder being Anglo
Americans.

They fish for lobster with wooden and wire

frame traps which are weighted with concrete and baited
with cowhide.
each.

These traps cost approximately $16 to $17

One boat can work between 800 to 1500 traps,

tending around 200 per trip.
These fishermen had many traps out when Andrew hit,
and estimate that they lost 70%-80% of them due to the
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storm.

On average, each fishing boat (which, for the

most part, is a distinct business enterprise in this
fishery) lost around 1,000 traps, or about $16,000 worth
of vital fishing gear in terms of its replacement cost.
Recall, on the other hand, that the core staff members
of the NMFS we interviewed made no mention of any
serious losses borne by these fishers as a result of the
storm.
The Miami River lobster fishers reported that they
had received some aid from the Florida SBA and the FEMA,
mainly in the form of small loans for purchasing new
lobster traps.

The amount of the loans they were deemed

eligible for were based on their past catch receipts.
Thus, the SBA made an estimate based on past reports of
lobster catches, estimated how many traps this
corresponded with, and thus determined the extent of
loans it would make to each applicant who was seeking to
replace lost gear.

However, the formula used by the SBA

resulted in a gear deficit, since prior to the storm the
average catch-per-trap only rarely ran as high as the
estimate used by the SBA.
The hurricane was described as a disaster by the
fishermen we talked with along the Miami River, since
their net loss of traps came about at a time when their
local industry was already economically depressed.

The
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primary cause cited by these local fishers for the
economic downturn in the fishery prior to Andrew was
over-regulation.

In 1991, for example, they paid a gear

levy of $0.15 per trap.

This levy was raised to $0.50

per trap a few months before the hurricane.

The

fishermen indicated that they were aware that this
increase was an attempt by regulatory officials to
decrease overall effort in the fishery, but noted that
it had not had that effect.

Instead, they said,

everybody just paid the increase and kept on fishing
as before, or even harder in some cases in an attempt
to offset the higher costs posed by the additional levy.
NOw, they stated, even though the total number of
traps being utilized was much less than the number being
utilized prior to the storm, the "government" was
maintaining the levy at the same, pre-storm level.

They

expressed anger about this, saying they had no idea what
the money goes for.

They also bitterly complained that

foreign fishermen, mainly Nicaraguans and Mexicans, were
not taxed as highly and were allowed to fish more
freely, and with more effective gear.

Overall, they

lamented that they had been in an adversarial
relationship with fishery officials from the DNR and the
NMFS for a long time.
Indeed, catch data we have subsequently obtained
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indicates that their catches were stable over at least
three years prior to the hurricane, perhaps indicating a
healthy, or at least stable, lobster stock, and calling
to question the need to increase the levies on their
traps prior to the storm.

Regardless, whether the

fishery was actually healthy or depressed prior to
Andrew, catch data following the hurricane leave no
doubt that it had a devastating impact on this fishery.
One processor showed us daily-activity reports
indicating unusually large catches of lobster during the
last three days of fishing before Andrew hit, and then,
immediately after the disaster his data indicated that
the lobsters had all but disappeared from the fishing
grounds.

And, even by mid-February, six months after

Andrew swept through the region's lobster fisheries,
catches were still unusually low, leading one DNR
official to characterize the season as overall "very
poor."
Recently, we have also learned (and opposite from
what DNR biologists reported immediately following the
storm) that bottom substrates in the lobster fishery
were severely impacted by the storm, perhaps with
devastating consequences for lobster stocks.

Whether

this disruption of the sea floor has greatly reduced
overall lobster stocks, or instead only greatly altered
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their customary migration routes, making it difficult
for fishers to locate them, is uncertain.

Whatever is

the case, Hurricane Andrew had a devastating impact on
this region's overall lobster catches, and it is an
adverse impact which persists today.
Our informants along the Miami River also told us
that all fishermen, from Miami all the way down to Key
West, had been hurt by the storm.

The spiny lobster,

they told us, was similarly important to fishers
throughout the Florida Keys.

Thus, late in our visit to

south Florida, we travelled to Key Largo, the north-most
of the major Keys, which had otherwise been missed by
Andrew's strong winds, in order to see what impact the
storm had, if any, on commercial fishing there.
In most of the Keys, we learned, electricity had
not been available for general public use for up to
three weeks following the storm.

Commercial fishers, as

well as fish processors, who were otherwise unharmed by
the storm, were temporarily put out of business.
Fishers, for example, had nobody to sell their products
to due to the lack of cold-storage, while processors
were put out of operation for the same reason.
Moreover, processors lost most of the stored products
they had on hand due to spoilage.

As a port agent from

Monroe County reported on August 27, three days after
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the hurricane hit:
Hurricane Andrew has severely limited all
fishing in the keys beginning on the 22nd when
warnings were first posted.

Although the keys

were spared a direct hit, the storm still
dealt a blow to the fishing industry.

In the

upper keys, early reports indicated some craft
and many lobster traps were destroyed.

And,

the shoreside infrastructure that escaped
damage was still non-functional due to power
outages and transport problems.

Even

fishermen in the lower keys were idled by
Andrew.

That was because most dealers held

their boats at the dock until logistics with
those few buyers still operational were
arranged.
After a three-week hiatus in fishing activity, a
handful of processors in the keys were able to resume
operations by promising to provide ice to the regional
populace at fixed prices in return for being given
priority in the restoration of electrical power.
Otherwise, most processors--and a large number of
fishers--remained closed and out of operation, with many
remaining so at the time of this report.

As mentioned

above, with such drastically decreased demand for the
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seafoods they customarily processed, many found
themselves economically unable to resume business
operations.
As of February, 1993, the spiny lobster catch was
still well below average throughout south Florida,
including the keys.

Most lodal fishery officials feel

the reason is Andrew's disturbance of seafloor bottom
substrates, which has in turn altered normal lobster
migration patterns.

Thus, we may conclude that

Hurricane Andrew had a severe and extensive impact on
south Florida's important spiny lobster industry--an
impact which is still being felt now.

Moreover, the

extent of damage to this fishery alone suggests that the
initial reports of minimal damage to fisheries in south
Florida were considerably underestimated.

And now, more

than half a year since the hurricane swept through south
Florida, while earnest efforts are underway to determine
the hurricane's overall impact on marine environments
and marine-biological resources, we are aware of no
studies which are similarly underway to determine the
social and economic impacts of the storm on the region's
commercial fishing populace, much less their current
needs for relief and reconstruction.
Impacts on the bait-shrimp industry. Bait-shrimp
fishers sell their catches to recreational fishers.

We
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interviewed bait fishers working out of the large
recreational marinas in Coconut Grove in metropolitan
Miami, as well as at the Black Point marina, south down
the coast, approximately where the center of the eye of
the storm came ashore.
The Black Point marina suffered the most severe
damages we saw anywhere along the Florida coastline.
All its facilities, and all the recreational fishing
boats kept there, were severely damaged, with most of
the recreational boats being a complete loss.
The fishing vessels used by bait. fishermen working
at Black Point came through somewhat better.

All 15 of

the "bait boats" operating out of this marina had been
severely damaged, and several were a complete loss.
That proportionately more of the commercial boats than
the recreational ones came through in at least
salvageable condition can be attributed to the
commercial fishermen's greater experience and knowledge
concerning how to secure their boats against extreme
storms, and also because most commercial fishermen lived
near the marina and were able to get there well before
the storm hit the coast.

Most of the recreational boat

owners, on the other hand, had not come to the marina to
secure their boats before the storm hit.

Nevertheless,

when we visited this area--two months after the
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storm--only 2 of the bait boats were operational, while
the rest were either undergoing repairs or waiting for
their owners to find sufficient resources to begin
repairs on them.
While all the fishermen we interviewed at Black
Point stated that they had sustained considerable damage
to their fishing craft, they were emphatic that repairs
were being hampered by the lack of financial assistance
from agencies which they felt should be responsible for
helping them.

Several fishermen commented that nobody

from the "fisheries service" (i.e., the Nl.fFS) had ever
come around to talk to them about damages they had
sustained, or to ask what their particular problems and
needs were in the aftermath of the storm.

When they

heard that we would be meeting with the core staff at
the NMFS regional offices in Miami, one group of
fishermen urged us to "tell them we're hurting."
At the Black Point marina the nearly complete loss
of the recreational fishing boats there had brought
extreme hardship to local bait fishermen.

Even the

dozen or so bait fishermen who were back in operation
found that without recreational customers to buy their
catches they were effectively left with no market for
their production.
One fisherman we spoke with was particularly
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informative concerning how grievously the hurricane had
impacted he and his family, as well as how they had
secured relief from various agencies.

After securing

his two boats somewhat inshore of the Black Point
marina, he described how he, his wife, and their four
small children had survived the storm by taking shelter
in their nearby home.

The house was totally destroyed,

he said, yet miraculously they had all survived with only
minor injuries.

In spite of this, he was emphatic that

he would never again choose to ride out a hurricane by
taking shelter in his own home if he could otherwise
find shelter out of the storm's direct path instead.
Afterwards, he said he and his family found relief in
one of the tents the FEMA helped erect for peoples left
homeless by the storm, and eventually, after being
helped by relatives and friends, they returned to their
own house site and began reconstruction there.
This young man, as well as several friends who
crewed with him, were busily repairing his one,
remaining boat when we interviewed him.

He said it

would be another two weeks before his boat would be
operational, and that had the hurricane not hit this
region he might be making as much as $2,000 per week.
Brown shrimp, he stated, were currently very abundant,
but because of damages to his boat he was not able to
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fish for them, and even if he could he was uncertain
whether he could sell his catches.

He also expressed

concern about the long-term effects on bait-shrimp
stocks which might result from the massive destruction
of the mangroves in his vicinity, which, he emphasized,
were the rearing grounds for the shrimp he targeted.
Indeed, as we talked with him we were amazed to see the
extent of destruction of the mangrove stands nearby,
which looked for all the world like a tangle of millions
of sticks and limbs, with no green leaves showing.
Particularly interesting was his telling us how he
had raised funds to help with repairs on his boat.
Apparently, he and his family had received aid for basic
living needs from the FEMA, but otherwise had received
no help, nor any queries concerning needs for help, from
any agencies which might have helped him to resume
fishing activities sooner.

Thus, he credited the

persistence of his wife, who, he said, had stayed on the
telephone and refused to become ensnared in
bureaucratic red tape, for eventually prying some loan
money out of the SBA, which he was now using to repair
his one, remaining fishing boat.

His cohorts, he said,

had received nothing.
By comparison, the bait fishermen working out of
the Coconut Grove marina in greater Miami reported a
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decreased demand for their products ever since the
storm, but otherwise stated that their losses were minor
compared with those suffered by their counterparts
working out of the Black point marina.

Otherwise, and

like their counterparts at Black Point, they similarly
expressed concern over what effect the storm might have
on future shrimp-stock levels stemming from destruction
of mangrove habitats along the coast.
Impacts on artificial reefs.

Artificial reefs

deployed along southeast Florida's coastline are
important to the region's commercial and recreational
fishers, as well as other components of the state's
recreational sector such as the diving industry.
Artificial reefs consist of sunken vessels or other
man-made structures, such as old oil rigs, and greatly
increase the productivity of marine life practically
anywhere they are located.
Among the twenty-six major artificial reefs situated
in the region hit by Andrew, twenty-two were damaged,
fifteen severely.

Those severely damaged included the

Arida (flattened and crushed), the Almirante (turned
upside down), the Miracles Express (reduced to rubble),
the Tarpon, and the Belzona Barge, which remains
completely missing, even now!

Concerning the Belzona

Barge, Ben Mostkof, Artificial Reef Coordinator in south
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Florida stated:
This was a barge two-thirds the length of a
football field.

It was so large that it took

five minutes to swim its length.

It's not the

kind of thing you would think would just
disappear (Mostkof 1992).
The artificial reefs which have been placed off the
Dade coast from the Broward line to Homestead are the
backbone of the local diving industry--including both
its recreational and commercial sectors.

Important

commercial and recreational species which are found in
and around these reefs include jacks, snapper, sea bass,
and grouper.
The devastation wrought on artificial reefs is also
clear evidence that seafloor configurations were
severely modified by the force of Andrew in the impact
area, a finding which is clearly opposite to what was
reported in National Fisherman shortly after the storm.
Robert Arnove, a Miami dive captain for 11 years, said
the following about the Tarpon, a l65-foot sunken
vessel:
Everything that was alive on the reef was
picked clean.

It was alive with soft corals,

sea fans, and sponges, and now nothing is
there.

It has been ripped right out of the
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bottom.

I swam way north and way south along

the reef and it's all the same.
devastated.

It's just

Looking to the future, you have

to wonder if it will ever be a viable dive
site again (Arnove 1992).
Since Andrew, the destruction of natural coral
reefs in south Florida has similarly hurt the local dive
economy, both commercial and recreational.

Again, this

impact was not quickly appreciated by local governmental
officials.

So far, we have received no assessments of

the impact on marine productivity which may have
resulted from damages to artificial and natural reefs
caused by Andrew, but we feel sure such impact will be
seen as very significant once it is fully known.
Impacts on fish processors, wholesalers and
retailers.

Fish processors and marketeers are an

essential link between marine resources and the public,
and are indispensable to commercial fishers who rely on
them to process and market their catches.

As mentioned

above, south Florida's fish processors and marketeers
were hard hit.
We analyzed information provided to the Florida DNR
by all fish processors and marketeers in south Florida
who operate either in the directly impacted area, the
area immediately surrounding it, or south of it in the
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keys.

Our data consisted of periodic reports which

processors and dealers sent to the DNR after the
hurricane.

Altogether, 108 reports from fish processors

and fishery-products dealers were examined, including 80
from Miami, 3 from Miami Beach, 1 from Coconut Grove, 1
from Coral Gables, 1 from Perrine, 9 from Homestead, 1
from Florida City, 10 from Key Largo, 1 from Tavernier,
and 1 from Big Pine Key.

Among the 108 reports we

examined, a total of 64, or 59%, reported adverse
impacts on their businesses stemming from Andrew.
These reported adverse impacts included losses
stemming from structural damage, the total loss of
facilities, and other losses, including losses of
products, electricity, refrigeration capacity, product
suppliers, capital (e.g., boats and traps), and income
in downtime while repairing facilities.

Phrases used to

describe these negative impacts included "damaged, not
yet open," "victims of Andrew," "destroyed by Andrew,"
"lost everything," "hit hard," "torn up," "wiped out,"
and "out of business due to Andrew."

As mentioned

above, most of the keys lost power for several weeks
following the storm, and some dealers are still without
electricity and refrigeration capacity even now.
During our field study we interviewed a major fish
processor/dealer in Key Largo concerning the impact of

-34-

Andrew.

His processing facility had escaped major

damage and had participated in the relief effort by
supplying badly needed ice to the more severely impacted
region immediately to the north.

He employed about a

dozen workers who processed and marketed the catches of
some 50 boats working in the immediate vicinity.
He stated that he was unaware of the extent of
damages to the fishing industry south of Key Largo, and
angrily stressed that no fisheries' agents had come to
assess damages to his operation, nor to assess damages
among the fishermen he served.

He saw Andrew as a new

and heavy burden on an already declining and
over-burdened fishery.

He blamed this decline on the

various regulatory agencies having authority over
Florida's fisheries, which, he said, had saddled the
commercial fishing industry with a tangle of confusing,
contradictory, and ever-changing regulations.

The

regulatory rules and policies, he said, were so
confusing, and so often changed, that he and local
fishers had no idea who had the "last word," and overall
this had created a situation of such great uncertainty
that it was hard for him and local fishers to remain
viable commercially.

He also complained that fishery

officials continuously harassed him and other local
fishers, saying they often behaved in a bullying and
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retaliatory manner.
Another major concern voiced by this operator was
the possibility of severe marine pollution and loss of
valuable marine species which may have resulted from the
abrupt opening of a major canal (C-lll) after Andrew
hit, in order to drain excess fresh water from the south
end of the Florida peninsula.

This canal empties into

Barnes Sound, a major fishing area near Key Largo.

The

operator we talked with in Key Largo expressed concerns
that fresh water from this canal had conveyed
fertilizers, pesticides, and other chemicals used mainly
in south Florida agriculture into Barnes Sound, with
potentially disastrous consequences for nearby coral
reefs and sea grasses.

However, what upset him the

most, he said, echoing the spiny-lobster fishers we had
talked with along the Miami River, was that nobody from
the state or federal agencies who were responsible for
the region's fisheries had ever asked him or any other
local fishers how they had been impacted by the
disaster, nor what their particular needs and problems
were in its aftermath.
Impact on the marine-recreational sector. The
recreational sector of south Florida's marine fisheries
inordinately overshadows the commercial sector in terms
of its economic significance and overall participation,
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and was severely impacted by Hurricane Andrew.

Indeed,

one of the most indelible memories of our trip to
Florida is the hundreds of crushed and utterly destroyed
recreational boats we saw at the Black Point Marina.
Certainly the hurricane caused substantial economic
losses for recreational boat owners, especially those
who were inadequately insured, as well as lost
recreational opportunities.

Moreover, it caused severe

economic losses for the large number of individuals and
business which supply and service the recreational boat
sector.
While not wishing to minimize the profound
aesthetic, recreational, social, and economic losses
suffered by south Florida's recreational fishing sector,
we felt it necessary to limit our investigation to the
region's commercial fishing peoples.

That is where our

expertise mainly lies, and we also feel that the needs
of commercial fishers in the aftermath of an extreme
event should take precedence over those of
recreationists.

This is because commercial fishers

ultimately depend on fishing activity for their
livelihood, whereas fishing for recreational fishers,
however much it enriches their lives, is not as crucial
to their overall well being.
An important exception, of course, is charterboat
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operators who take clients out for fishing, diving, and
other activities.

We mention them in this section

because they are often regarded by regulatory
authorities as a part of the recreational-fishing
sector.

We regard them as "commercial fishers" because

fishing is their means of livelihood.

In south Florida,

many charterboat operators suffered severe impacts from
the hurricane, including lost or damaged vessels, gear,
and shore facilities, downtime, and a diminished stream
of clients.

Many of these operators rely on the

abundance of marine species found around southeast
Florida's artificial reefs to support their businesses,
and thus may not find the marine life as robust there in
the near future as it was prior to the storm.
Impacts on fishery habitat, including mangroves,
seagrasses, coral reefs, and sea turtle nesting areas.
Various government agencies and scientific institutions,
including the Florida DNR, the NMFS, the RSMAS, and many
others have by now launched investigations concerning
Hurricane Andrew's overall impact on the marine
environment and important marine resources found in the
waters around south Florida.

And, not surprisingly,

their preliminary reports all suggest that the storm did
indeed have a devastating and extensive impact on these
environments and resources, which is opposite the
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earlier views about the storm's impact which were
expressed by certain fisheries' officials in south
Florida.
It is not our intention here to elaborate upon
these marine-environmental impacts, since our
investigation focused mainly on the impacts of the storm
on people, and not on marine resources per se.

An

important point to remember, however, is that
practically every report describing damages to south
Florida's marine environments, and especially those
describing impacts in any region which is designated as
a "fishery," almost certainly implies unfavorable
consequences for the people who depended on those
fisheries for their livelihoods.

Discussion
Clearly, the impact of Hurricane Andrew on
commercial fishers living in southeast Florida was more
severe than what was suggested in the early reports
about the storm.

This damage must be appreciated from

an holistic perspective of these fisheries, which
emphasizes the human actors who are articulated with the
various marine resources.
Interesting parallels and contrasts regarding
response to impacts on commercial fishers in south
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Florida can be drawn from examining the responses to two
other extreme events impacting commercial fishers:

the

Exxon Valdez oil spill (EVOS) in Alaska, and the impact
of Hurricane Andrew on commercial fishers in Louisiana
(regarding the EVOS, see Dyer 1993a;
Picou 1992;

Dyer, Gill, and

and Picou, Gill, Dyer, and Curry 1992.

Regarding Louisiana, see Dyer 1993b).
The EVOS greatly threatened the sustainabilty of
Alaskan communities which were highly dependent on
renewable fishery resources in their immediate vicinity.
However, unlike in Florida, commercial fishers in Alaska
were given considerable attention in the aftermath of
the EVOS, including extensive assessments of their
damages and what their immediate needs were for
recovery.

Also unlike in Florida, the Alaska-coast

natural-resource communities which were impacted by the
EVOS, and which depended on fishery resources, differed
considerably from the natural-resource communities of
commercial fishers in south Florida.

For one thing, a

higher proportion of Alaska's coastal populace is
dependent on local fisheries, and commercial fishers
have high visibility along the Alaska coast.

Moreover,

Alaska's commercial fishers have less competition from
recreational fishers.
The situation in Louisiana was similar to that in
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Alaska.

As in Alaska, commercial fishing peoples in

Louisiana who were impacted by Hurricane Andrew are a
highly visible and economically important component of
the coastal population.

Indeed, commercial fishing in

Louisiana is regarded as very important to the economic
welfare of the state as a whole.

Commercial fishing

activity also overshadows recreational fishing in terms
of its economic importance in Louisiana, with
Louisiana's commercial fishers experiencing less
competition with the recreational sector than do their
counterparts in south Florida.
Hurricane Andrew's impact on commercial fishing
peoples in Louisiana was quickly assessed by state and
federal agencies, and problems among fishers,
processors, and their families were responded to in a
comprehensive and effective manner.

Knowing full well

the importance of the commercial fisheries in the state,
various agencies in Louisiana immediately launched
projects to account for the enormous losses in the
state's fishing industry brought about by the storm.
Support for Louisiana's commercial fishers was also
taken up by various state representatives, including
Senator Tauzin, who sought exemptions from certain
regulations which fishermen felt might hinder their
abilities to recuperate from the hurricane's impacts.
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In sum, we feel the following factors explain the
almost non-response to the damages and needs of south
Florida's commercial fishers stemming from Hurricane
Andrew:
1.

The low visibility of commercial fishers in

south Florida, owing to their geographic dispersion,
and integration with a far larger urban, suburban, and
exurban populace scattered along the south Florida
coast.
2.

The low numbers of commercial fishers in south

Florida relative to the size of the total human populace
in the region.

Recall that one of the NMFS officials

we interviewed in Miami had said that there were "almost
no commercial fishermen" along Florida's southeast
coast.

Perhaps the reality of "almost no commercial

fishermen" was conducive to producing a mindset among
fisheries' authorities that there were not enough
fishing people to worry about.
Because our trip involved little more than a brief
reconnaissance, we do not have exhaustive data
concerning how many commercial fishing people there were
in south Florida when the hurricane hit.

Nevertheless,

we feel certain that in the aggregate these constituted
a significant population.

By counting licensed fishers,

processors, and marketeers for whom we do have reliable
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data, and adding their estimated numbers of dependents,
we feel there were more than a thousand people in the
directly impacted region of south Florida who depended
on commercial fishing before the hurricane hit.

And, if

we consider all fishers and their dependents in south
Florida, including the keys, who were adversely impacted
by Hurricane Andrew, then we feel these amounted to
several thousand people.
3.

The large number of recreational fishers in

south Florida as compared with commercial fishers, their
greater visibility, and especially their greater ability
to influence fisheries-management assessments, policies,
and regulations.

As Dr. William W. Fox, current

director of the National Marine Fisheries Service and
former head of the Florida Marine Fisheries Commission
has said of Florida's fisheries, "I think you'll find
that most of our regulations were oriented toward
recreational fishing"
4.

(Fox 1990:

44).

Longstanding antipathy and adversarial

relationships between participants in the commercial
fishing industry and various governmental agents who are
responsible for managing the fisheries.

Unfortunately,

this has prompted feelings of apathy and futility among
both groups concerning any benefits that might accrue
from initiating communications with one another.
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5.

No municipal, city, county, regional, state, or

federal agencies acknowledged responsibility for
assessing the impacts of the storm on the commercial
fishing industry, nor for determining what was needed in
the way of relief and recovery assistance following the
event.

A FEMA representative we spoke with in south

Florida, when we asked him if he felt there was a need
for someone to address the impacts of Hurricane Andrew
on natural resource users--including specific
occupational groups such as commercial fishers--agreed
that there was definitely such a need, and that this
represented a deficiency in the response capabilities of
the FEMA.
6.

Unconcern, and perhaps antipathy, for

commercial fishing peoples in the local marine-science
community.

When we visited the main offices of the

RSMAS, the only concern regarding commercial fishers we
saw was negative, consisting of leaflets posted on
entrance doors and interior bulletin boards which urged
a ban on commercial fisher's use of certain types of
nets.

Moreover, although we have corresponded with the

RSMAS since our visit, urging that it include a study of
commercial fishers in its proposed interdisciplinary
project to study the impacts of Andrew in south Florida,
we are unaware it has any plans to do so.
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We also visited the University of Miami main campus
while we were in Florida, but were unable to learn of
any faculty members there who were conducting studies of
the hurricane's impact on south Florida's commercial
fishers.
7.

An erroneous view which appeared in the print

and other media in the early aftermath of the event,
which greatly underestimated the storm's impacts on the
fisheries, and which, perhaps, was subsequently reified
by some authorities as justification for not concerning
themselves any further.

Recommendations
Among the various agencies of the

u.s.

federal

government, the NMFS is the one which should take
responsibility for assessing impacts and needs of
commercial fishing peoples stemming from extreme natural
and technological events.

This agency already has an

organizational structure with established networks of
communications between the fisheries in coastal regions
and its central headquarters.

Moreover, it has more

information, and more experience working with commercial
fishing peoples, than any other agency in the federal
government.

Thus, a component should be developed

within this agency which will concern itself with

-45-

extreme events in coastal areas, and especially with the
impacts of such events on commercial fishing peoples.
This component should also work closely with other
federal agencies including the FEMA and the SBA, as well
as with state and local agencies having interests in
local fisheries.
The Fisheries Conservation and Management Act of
1976 (now simply know as the "Magnuson Act," after the
name of its original sponsor) mandates that the NMFS
concern itself not only with the welfare of fishery
resources, but also with the welfare of fishing peoples.
Thus, the act requires that the NMFS consider social
impacts in the formulation of fishery-management
policies.

Unfortunately, however, there is no

legislation (or, at least, none that we are aware of)
which specifically requires the NMFS to assess impacts
and to assist commercial fishing peoples in the
aftermath of extreme events which impact the fisheries.
We feel the NMFS has remained unduly focused on
fishery resources, rather than on what should be their
first concern--fishing peoples--and continues to define
its role and principal responsibilities as lying mainly
in the realm of marine conservation, rather than in
promoting the well being of maritime people (see Fox
1990:

44-45).
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Our conclusions are drawn from little more than a
brief field trip by two investigators to this region, as
well as extensive queries through correspondence both
before our trip and continuing ever since.

And, while

we do not have quantitatively comprehensive data which
measures and assesses the overall impact of Hurricane
Andrew on south Florida's commercial fishing peoples, we
feel we have conclusive proof that this impact was very
serious indeed.
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